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The Process Due Upon Confession Of
Judgment In Pennsylvania And § 1983
Liability Upon The Private Attorney: A
Proposed Solution*

I.

Introduction

A private attorney who enlists Pennsylvania's current procedure for executing' on a confessed judgment 2 may be held liable
For a private attorney asserting a good faith
under § 1983.
liable under § 1983, the attorney must be shown
to
be
held
defense
to have acted with malice or recklessness.4 Section 1983, a civil
rights statute, provides liability when a person is found to have
deprived another of any rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed
under the United States Constitution, while acting under the color
of law.5 When state action deprives a debtor/defendant of
property without notice or hearing and without a valid waiver of
rights,6 the debtor's due process rights7 are necessarily violated.
* This Comment was submitted for consideration of membership in December 1995
and was selected in March 1996 for publication. After its selection for publication, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the proposed rules which constitute the focus of this
Comment. The author's analysis of both the need for and the goals of the newly adopted
Rules remains timely. - Editor
1. PA. R.C.P. 3102-48. A writ of execution is a formal process issued by the court
generally evidencing the debt of the defendant to the plaintiff and commanding the officer
to take the property of the defendant in satisfaction of the debt. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY
568 (6th ed. 1990).
2. PA. R.C.P. 2950-86 (authorizing and providing the procedure by which the
prothonotary enters judgment against a debtor for the amount the debtor, by note, bond, or
other instrument, has declared, that is confessed, as a liability).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See also Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20
F.3d 1250, 1267 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a private attorney who enlists the compulsive
powers of the state to seize property by executing on a confessed judgment without predeprivation notice or hearing may be held liable under § 1983).
4. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1276.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
6. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (holding that the waiver of constitutional
rights is a question of federal law). Although the exact federal standard governing a valid
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, through its Civil
Procedural Rules Committee, has proposed 8 to change this curious
outcome by making substantive changes in the Commonwealth's
civil procedure rules governing confessions of judgment for money9
and for possession of real property." The critical sections of the
proposed rules aim to abolish confessions of judgment in consumer
credit transactions1" and seek to provide the defendant with notice
in every case prior to or during an execution on a confessed
judgment."l
The abolition of confession of judgment clauses in consumer
credit transactions stems from the reality that such transactions
frequently involve an unsophisticated debtor13 who is usually
without the benefit of counsel. 4 This disadvantage may lead to
a waiver of rights by the debtor that falls short of the voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently standard.15
The proposed notice requirements aim to provide predeprivation notice to the defendant as well as an opportunity for a
hearing on the merits. 6 The proposed rules have a provision

waiver in the context of a confession of judgment has not been fully spelled out, Jordan, 20
F.3d at 1273, the standard of "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, waived" is generally
used, D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. On April 1, 1996, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the proposed rules
governing the Confession of Judgement for Money, see 26 Pa. Bull. 1806-14 (Apr. 20, 1996)
and the Confession of Judgment in Ejectment for Possession of Real Property, see 26 Pa.
Bull. 1814-18 (Apr. 20, 1996), both provisions are to become effective as of July 1, 1996.
9. Compare PA. R.C.P. 2950-62 with PA. R.C.P. 2950-67 (Proposed Recommendation
No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull. 2375-79 (June 17, 1995).
10. Compare PA. R.C.P. 2970-76 with PA. R.C.P. 2970-76 (Proposed Recommendation
No. 127, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull. 2386-89 (June 17, 1995).
11. A "consumer credit transaction" in this context "means a credit transaction in which
the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person and the money, property
or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family or
household purposes." PA. R.C.P. 2950 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2375 (June 17, 1995).
12. PA. R.C.P. 2958.1-2958.3, Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,
1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull. 2377-78, 2382-86 (June 17, 1995).
13. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 198 (1971) (citing study representing that 96% of
confessed judgment debtors had annual incomes of less than $10,000); PA. R.C.P.
Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2382
(June 17, 1995).
14. PA. R.C.P. 2950 explanatory cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995),
reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2382 (July 17, 1995).
15. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
16. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995) reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2383 (June 17, 1995). "Proposed rules 2958.1 and 2958.2 provide a defendant
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providing for an immediate post-seizure hearing to address the
issue of waiver. 7 These proposed notice and hearing requirements apply prior to any permanent property deprivation, thus
curtailing the attachment of liability under § 1983.18
This Comment examines the proposed rule changes to the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and analyzes the imposition
of § 1983 liability upon private attorneys as interpreted by Jordan
v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel19 Part II of this Comment
explains the historical and procedural basis for confessions of
judgment and writs of execution in Pennsylvania. Part III examines
the criticism the Pennsylvania process has acquired over the years
by the federal courts and the support the procedure has received
from Pennsylvania state courts. This section will also explain the
problems within the Pennsylvania procedure as delineated by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Jordan. Part IV explains
the basis for the imposition of § 1983 liability upon private
attorneys acting on behalf of their clients. Part IV also explores
the substance of liability under § 1983 and the alternative grounds
for defending against such a charge. Finally, Part V examines the
proposed rule changes promulgated by Pennsylvania's Civil
Procedural Rules Committee and surveys their likelihood for
success.
II. Confessions of Judgment and Writs of Execution-Background and Procedure
A. Historical Origin
A confession of judgment is "the act of a debtor in permitting
judgment to be entered against him by his creditor for a stipulated
sum, by a written statement to that effect or by warrant of

with notice and an opportunity for hearing on the underlying issues before the deprivation
of property occurs and thus before § 1983 liability might attach." Id.
17. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in Pa. Bull. 2383, 2384 (June 17, 1995).
18. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2383 (June 17, 1995).
19. 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994). Jordan involves a commercial lessee who filed suit
against the lessor and the law firm representing the lessor alleging that they had deprived
the lessee of its due process rights by executing on a confessed judgment without predeprivation hearing or notice. Id.
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attorney, without the institution of legal proceedings of any
kind."'2 Simply, a confessed judgment means a judgment entered
upon a debtor's acknowledgment of the amount owed without the
formality, time, or expense involved in an ordinary adverse
proceeding.2 Although legal proceedings are not instituted under
a confessed judgment, a judgment by confession is as final as a
judgment by jury verdict.22
The origin of today's confession of judgment can be traced
back to Blackstone. At the time of his writing Commentaries on
the Law of England, Blackstone noted four types of judgments in
existence in common law England: a demurrer, verdict, non-suit,
and confession. 23 This final type occurred where the facts and the
law were admitted by the defendant.24 Blackstone further explains that a creditor, in order to increase security, would have the
debtor execute a warrant of attorney 25 to some attorney named by
the creditor.26 This attorney would hold the authority to confess
judgment against the debtor, in favor of the creditor, for the
specific amount due.27 The law and the courts considered this
judgment by confession as binding and final as any other judgment.28
Pennsylvania courts have long held29 that the common law
acknowledged confessed judgments in an amicable action;3" that
is, without the institution of an adverse legal action. Prior to the

20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 842 (6th ed. 1990). The definition continues: "At
common law, judgment entered where defendant, instead of entering plea, confessed action,
or withdrew plea and confessed action. Judgment where a defendant gives the plaintiff a
cognovit or written confession of the action by virtue of which the plaintiff enters judgment."
Id.
21.

RICHARD H. KLEIN, JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1-2 (1929).

22.
23.
24.
25.

Braddee v. Brownfield, 4 Watts 474, 475 (Pa. 1835).
2 COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE 1151 (4th ed. 1899).
Id.
A warrant of attorney is a written instrument, addressed to one or more attorneys,

authorizing them to appear on behalf of the person giving it, and to confess judgment in
favor of some particular named person in an action of debt. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1585 (6th ed. 1990).
26. 2 COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE 1152 (4th Ed. 1899).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Reed v. Hamet, 4 Watts 441, 442 (Pa. 1835) (proclaiming that confessions of
judgment have been valid in the Commonwealth since the founding of the province).
30. 1 ROBERT C. SPRENKLE, JR., PENNSYLVANIA CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT 7 (1982).
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Act of February 24, 1806,3" judgment by confession could be
obtained by this amicable action or by cognovit actionem.32 The
case of Cook v. Gilberta3 considered the question of whether,
under the Act of March 21, 1806,"4 an attorney had the authority
to enter an amicable action.35 Summarily, the court concluded
that the long-standing practice by which an attorney entered an
amicable action existed independently from the Act.36 Neither of
these acts altered the common law basis of confessed judgments.
Under Pennsylvania's statutory law, confessions of judgment
were given legislative sanction by the Act of February 24, 1806, 37
the Act of March 21, 1806,38 and the Act of June 13, 1836. 39 The
Act of February 24, 1806, authorized the prothonotary to enter
judgment for a stated amount of money directly against the debtor
at the request of the creditor without the institution of legal
process.' The Act of March 21, 1806 allowed for the parties to
enter into and file an amicable action that included a confession of
judgment without the necessity of an attorney. 41 The Act of June
13, 1836, provided for the commencement of an amicable action
through an attorney.42 This Act did not prove any more useful
than the Act of March 21, 1806. In interpreting both of these acts,

31. Act of February 24, 1806, ch. 2646, § 28, 1806 Pa. Stat. at Large 61, 72, repealed by
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 20002 (1981).

32. Cognovit actionem is defined as a written confession of action against himself by a
defendant. It is usually made upon condition and is supposed to be given in court. Its
issuance impliedly authorizes the plaintiffs attorney to sign the judgment and issue an
execution. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1990).
33. 8 Serg. & Rawle 566 (Pa. 1822).
34. Act of March 21, 1806, ch. 2698, § 8, 1806 Pa. Stat. at Large 229, 234, repealed by
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 20002 (1981) [hereinafter Act of March 2, 1806]; KLEIN, supra
note 21, at 98 (stating that the Act was passed to allow laymen to have judgment entered on
such promissory notes without retaining and paying an attorney to do the same).
35. Cook, 8 Serg. & Rawle at 567.
36. Id.
37. Act of February 24, 1806, ch. 2646, § 28, 1806 Pa. Stat. at Large 61, 72 (bestowing
upon the prothonotary the duty to enter judgment against a person so confessing), repealed
by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 20002 (1982) [hereinafter Act of February 24, 1806].
38. Act of March 21, 1806, supra note 34 (allowing institution of an amicable suit
without the necessity of an attorney).
39. Act of June 13, 1836, ch. 170, § 40, 1836 Pa. Laws 568, 579, repealed by 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 20002 (1981) [hereinafter Act of June 13, 1836].
40. Act of February 24, 1806, supra note 37. See generally SPRENKLE, supra note 30,
at 10.
41. Act of March 21, 1806, supra note 34. See generally SPRENKLE, supra note 30, at
11-12.
42. Act of June 13, 1836, supra note 39.
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the courts of Pennsylvania have concluded that amicable actions
are founded in the common law and are not dependent upon
authorization by the legislature.43 All three of these enactments
have been repealed by the Judiciary Act Repealer Act.' The
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure largely adopted the Act of
February 24, 1806. 45
B. ProceduralBasis

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
on January 1, 1970, and currently provide for confessions of
judgment to be entered by the prothonotary46 under Rule
2951(a)4 7 or for a complaint procedure under Rules 2951(b) 48 and
2971. 4' Rule 2951(a) allows the prothonotary to enter judgments
by confession on a written instrument that confessed or authorized
confession by an attorney or other person against the signor and in
favor of the original holder or, unless forbidden in the instrument,
in favor of assignees or transferees. 0 This rule also directs that
a certificate of residence of both the plaintiff and the defendant be
filed.51
Rule 2951(b) must be utilized instead of 2951(a) if the

instrument confessing judgment is more than ten years old; if the
original instrument cannot be produced for filing; if the instrument
requires the occurrence of a default or a condition precedent
before judgment may be entered, and the existence or non-

43. SPRENKLE, supra note 30, at 12. Flanigen v. City of Phila., 51 Pa. 491, 493
(1866)("The amicable action and confession of judgment is according to ancient and
established practice existing before the Act of 1806, as well as since .... ").
44. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 20002 (1982). The Judiciary Act Repealer Act is used
to completely repeal old and obsolete acts and laws. Id.
45. See PA. R.C.P. 2951(a).
46. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2731-2738 (1981). Under Pennsylvania law the
prothonotary has the power and duty to administer oaths and affirmations, to affix and attest
the seal of the court to all the process of the court, to enter all judgments, including those
by confession, to enter all satisfactions of civil judgments, and to act as an officer of the
court. Id.
47. PA. R.C.P. 2951(a) (providing for entry of judgment by the prothonotary without
the necessity of filing a complaint).
48. PA. R.C.P. 2951(b) (providing for a complaint procedure where judgment cannot be
entered by the prothonotary under subdivision (a)). The required contents of the complaint
are listed and explained at PA. R.C.P. 2952. See infra notes 52-54.
49. PA. R.C.P. 2971 (providing that the commencement of an action for possession of
real property through a confession of judgment must be by complaint).
50. PA. R.C.P. 2951(a).
51. Id.
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existence of the occurrence cannot be determined from the
instrument; or, if the computation of the amount due requires
consideration of matters outside the instrument. 2 If any of the
above circumstances exist, the confession of judgment may only be
commenced by filing a complaint with the prothonotary.53 Even
if a plaintiff can proceed under subdivision (a), he may elect to
utilize subdivision (b). 4
After the prothonotary enters this judgment by confession, the

prothonotary must notify the defendant that a judgment has been
This notice must include a copy of the
entered against him.
document the plaintiff filed in support of the confessed judgment.56

A money judgment may be enforced by a writ of execution.57
The writ is secured by filing a praecipe with the prothonotary. 8
The praecipe must set forth a description of any property in which
the plaintiff believes he may have an interest, including bank
accounts and deposits.5 In the case of bank accounts or deposits,
the60plaintiff must name the bank holding the deposits as garnishee.
The writ of execution, in effect, commands the sheriff to seize
the property of the defendant that the plaintiff has described, or,

52. PA. R.C.P. 2951(b).
53. PA. R.C.P. 2951(a); PA. R.C.P. 2952. The complaint must contain the following: (1)
the names and last known addresses of the parties; (2) the original or photostatic
reproduction of the instrument showing the defendant's signature; (3) a statement of any
assignment of the instrument; (4) a statement that judgment has not been entered on the
instrument in any jurisdiction, or if it has been entered, an identification of the proceedings;
(5) an itemized computation of the amount then due; (6) a demand for judgment as
authorized by the warrant; (7) an application for a court order granting leave to enter
judgment after notice if the instrument is in excess of twenty years old or if the original or
copy of the instrument is not attached to the complaint; (8) a signature and verification in
accordance with the rules relating to a civil action; 9) the complaint shall not contain a notice
to defend or a notice to plead. Id.
54. PA. R.C.P. 2951(b).
55. PA. R.C.P. 236(a)(1).
56. PA. R.C.P. 236; Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1262
(3d Cir. 1994).
57. PA. R.C.P. 3102.
58. PA. R.C.P. 3103.
59. PA. R.C.P. 3102-03.
60. PA. R.C.P. 3101(b). A person may be a garnishee if she owes a debt to a defendant,
holds property of the defendant in her custody, holds as fiduciary property in which the
defendant has an interest, holds legal title to property of the defendant, or if she owns or
possesses real property subject to a mortgage, judgment or other lien in which the defendant
has an interest. Id.
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in the case of a garnishee, to serve upon the garnishee the writ of
execution.6 ' By serving the writ upon a garnishee, all of the
defendant's property held by the garnishee at present or in the
future is attached.6 2 The attachment freezes the defendant's
accounts, preventing the garnishee from paying any sums out of the
accounts until further63 direction from the court or until the
attachment terminates.
Relief from a judgment by confession can be obtained by a
petition to open and/or strike the judgment. 64 If the petition
states a prima facie basis for the relief, the court must issue a rule
to show cause to the plaintiff.65 The plaintiff then must file an
answer by the date of return for the rule.66 While the petition to
open and/or strike the judgment is pending, any encumbrance so
imposed on the defendant's property will be preserved.6 7
The lien of the judgment is not affected by the filing of the
petition or the rule to show cause unless the defendant posts a
bond, with approved security, with the prothonotary in an amount
equal to the plaintiff's outstanding judgment, including interest and
costs.'
The court, however, may use its discretion in deciding
whether or not an execution will be stayed until the petition to
strike or open judgment is decided.6 9 This use of discretion entails
the balancing of the debtor's and creditor's rights.7" Absent use
of the court's discretion to stay execution on the judgment, a
defendant may obtain a stay by claiming an exemption from

61. PA. R.C.P. 3111.
62. PA. R.C.P. 3111(b).
63. PA. R.C.P. 3111 (punishing a garnishee with contempt if the garnishee pays out of
defendant's accounts despite attachment as well as providing a procedure for service of writ
of execution upon a garnishee).
64. PA. R.C.P. 2959.
65. PA. R.C.P. 2959(b).
66. Id.
67. PA. R.C.P. 2959(f). This rule further provides that a party waives all defenses and
objections which they do not include in the petition or answer. PA. R.C.P. 2959(c).
68. PA. R.C.P 2959(b); PA. R.C.P. 3143(b).
69. PA. R.C.P. 2959(b).
70. See Kronz v. Kronz, 574 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating court has inherent
power to stay proceedings after balancing the rights of the debtor and creditor). See also
Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of Phila. v. Philadelphia, 188 A. 314, 317-18 (Pa. 1936)
(granting stay where immediate enforcement of execution would cause unnecessary hardship
to the judgment debtor).
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execution or by petition for a stay due to a defect in the writ, levy,
or service, or upon any other legal or equitable grounds.7'
If a judgment is opened, it does not disturb the judgment itself,
but rather the petition to open judgment is used to show that the
defendant can demonstrate a valid defense to all or part of the
plaintiff's claim.
Under this scenario a plaintiff will attempt to
prove the case in the usual manner with the defendant asserting
any defenses available under the law.73 A stricken judgment
annuls any execution founded upon that judgment and completely
destroys the judgment while leaving the rights of the parties as
though a judgment had never been entered.74 A petition to strike
judgment will only be granted where the defects are apparent on
the face of the record."
Unless a stay of execution is employed, a plaintiff may execute
on a confession of judgment by seizing property attached twenty
days after the day the prothonotary originally mailed the notice of
the entry of judgment to the defendant.76 Seizure is sanctioned
after twenty days even where a petition to strike or open judgment
is pending or if the judgment has been opened.7 7 The decision to
allow execution or to grant a stay during these stages is soundly
within the court's discretion.78
As is evident from the preceding discussion and explanation of
Pennsylvania's confession of judgment and execution procedure,
questions concerning the due process rights of the judgment debtor
abound. These questions focus on the need of a valid waiver of
due process rights at the time the defendant signs the confession of
judgment, and the provision to the defendant of sufficient notice

71. PA. R.C.P. 3121(d). See Ralston Purina Co. v. Clem E. Clarke & Son, Inc., 53 Pa.
D. & C.2d 737 (1971) (citing equitable principles); Steckel v. Strickland, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d
784 (1971) (finding an invalid judgment to be a fatal defect and unable to support a writ of
execution).
72. Macioce v. Glinatsis, 522 A.2d 94, 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
73. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1263 (3d Cir. 1994).
74.

12 PA. STANDARD PRACrICE 2d. § 71.225 (1983).

75. PNC Bank v. Balsamo, 634 A.2d 645, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), alloc denied, 648
A.2d 790 (Pa. 1994).
76. PA. R.C.P. 2958(b).
77. Id. Continental Bank v. Frank, 495 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (following
the principle that execution may proceed even where a judgment has been opened).
78. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Staats, 631 A.2d 631,634-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Kronz
v. Kronz, 574 A.20 91, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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and an opportunity to79 be heard prior to any execution upon the
defendant's property.
III. Judicial Interpretation of Pennsylvania Procedure
Both the Pennsylvania state courts and the federal courts have
examined these above mentioned due process concerns. Each
group of courts have reached a different conclusion as to the
validity of the Commonwealth's procedure.
A. Pennsylvania State Court Holdings
Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that executions on
confessed judgments are not violative of the debtor's due process
rights so long as the defendant has been afforded an opportunity
to be heard.8" The standard of sufficiency of the evidence which
a court must employ to open a confessed judgment is that of a
directed verdict.81 This requires the court to view all of the
evidence in a light most favorable to the petitioner and accept as
true all evidence and proper inferences derived therefrom which
support the defense, while rejecting adverse allegations of the party
obtaining the judgment.82
In North Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Schultz," the
Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that a trial court's exercise
of discretion in denying the defendant's petition to open a
confessed judgment did not deprive the defendant of due process.' While recognizing the due process requirement of being
heard prior to interference with property rights, the court held that
"hearing" did not mean a full trial but rather it meant only an
opportunity to be heard commensurate with the interest being
asserted.
In North Penn, the superior court considered the

79. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1270-71 (3d Cir. 1994).
80. See North Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Schultz, 378 A.2d 1275, 1278 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1977) (holding that due process does not necessarily require a full trial). Due process
is met if an individual is given notice and a meaningful hearing prior to the loss of a
protected property right. King v. Olser, 27 Cumb. 29, 32 (1976).
81. Dollar Bank v. Northwood Cheese Co., 637 A.2d 309, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994),
alloc. denied, 653 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1994).

82. Id.; Weitzman v. Ulan, 450 A.2d 173, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
83. 378 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
84. Id. at 1277.
85. Id. at 1277-78.
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Commonwealth's
procedural opportunities sufficient to satisfy due
86

process.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reached the same conclusion
in Dollar Bank v. Northwood Cheese Co.,' when it considered
whether the immediate issuance of a garnishment execution upon
the appellant's bank accounts after a confessed judgment had been
entered was violative of due process.88 The court held that the
defendant's due process rights were not violated because the
defendant utilized Pennsylvania's procedural opportunities to
counter the confessed judgment.89 The compilation of these
procedural opportunities equaled an opportunity for "hearing"
sufficient to meet due process in the eyes of the court.' °
Pennsylvania state courts have held that the procedural
opportunities for hearing prior to the deprivation of property are
considered meaningful if they challenge the validity of the
confession of judgment 9 ' and allow the defendant an opportunity
to open the judgment upon a showing by the defendant of a valid
defense to the plaintiff's judgment.92
B. Federal Court Holdings

In contrast to Pennsylvania state courts, the federal courts have
cast shadows of doubt upon the sufficiency of hearing and notice
in the Commonwealth prior to the deprivation of a judgment
debtor's property.9 3

The United States District Court for the

86. Id. at 1278 (noting that appellants had utilized a number of procedural devices). In
North Penn the court found that the appellants' use of procedural opportunities, such as a
petition to open, a stay of execution, a rule to show cause why judgment should not be
opened, depositions in support of the petition, and oral argument, satisfied due process. Id.
87. 637 A.2d 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), alloc. denied, 653 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1994).
88. Id. at 313.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. A petition to strike a confessed judgment is proper only when the defect in the
judgment appears on the face of the record. PNC Bank v. Balsamo, 634 A.2d 645, 649 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993), alloc denied, 648 A.2d 790 (Pa. 1994).
92. A judgment taken by confession will be opened in only a limited number of
circumstances, and only when the person seeking to have it opened acts promptly, alleges
a meritorious defense, and presents sufficient evidence of that defense to require submission
of the issue to the jury. First Seneca Bank & Trust Co. v. Laurel Mountain Dev. Corp., 485
A.2d 1086, 1088 (Pa. 1984).
93. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1971) (declaring the Pennsylvania process of
confession of judgment unconstitutional as per a defined class of persons); Jordan v. Fox,
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994) (questioning the due process
provided by Pennsylvania's confession of judgment and writ of execution procedure); In re
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Souders9 4 held the
Pennsylvania procedure regarding the entry of judgment by
confession unconstitutional on its face.9 5 The Souders court
reasoned that unless a hearing occurred on the issue of waiver
before the creditor entered judgment, the debtor's due process
rights would be violated every time a judgment was entered and an
effective waiver had not been obtained.96 To solve this defect, the
court suggested that a hearing on waiver must be held prior to
allowing judgment to be entered.97 The Souders court reached the
"unmistakable conclusion" that the entry of a confessed judgment
against a debtor and the attempt of the creditor to execute upon
that judgment resulted in a violation of the debtor/defendant's due
process rights, absent a judicial determination of the waiver
issue."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
FRG, Inc. v. Manley99 overruled the holding of Souders and held
that the Pennsylvania procedure for the entry of confessions of
judgment was not facially unconstitutional.1" Here the court
further rejected the reasoning of Souders as applied to Swarb v.
Lennox."0 ' As the FRG court correctly points out, the Souders
opinion incorrectly reasoned that just because the Supreme Court
in Swarb held that confessions of judgment were per se unconstitutional as per a limited class of individuals, it did not mean that
confessions of judgment were valid as to every other class or
person. 1°2 FRG looked to Swarb in recognizing that, in some
instances, debtors could be found to have legally waived their due
process rights.1 3 This being the case, Pennsylvania procedure
could not be per se unconstitutional."

Souders, 75 B.R. 427 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. '1987) (declaring Pennsylvania's procedure for
confessions of judgment unconstitutional per se).
94. 75 B.R. 427 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 435-36.
98. Id. at 436.
99. 919 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 856.
101. 405 U.S. 191 (1971).
102. FRG, 919 F.2d at 856; In re Souders, 75 B.R. at 435.
103. FRG, 919 F.2d at 856; Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084,
1095-96 (3d Cir. 1988).
104. The FRG court also looked to D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972),
to support its determination that Pennsylvania's procedure for confessing judgment was not
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The question of due process again surfaced in Jordan v. Fox,
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel.0' In that case the issues of
central import were the sufficiency of hearing °6and notice in the
context of executions on confessed judgments.'
C. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel"°
Jordan involved a consolidation of appeals"°8 revolving
around a disputed commercial lease between a commercial landlord
and one of its tenants, Jordan Mitchell, Inc." During the course
of the dispute, the attorneys for the landlord invoked a confession
of judgment clause from a form lease signed by Jordan Mitchell's
predecessor tenant.'
The prothonotary of the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas entered judgment against the tenant for
the specified amount owed.'
The sheriff then garnished Jordan
Mitchell's checking account without prior notice or hearing."'
Jordan Mitchell later filed suit claiming the Pennsylvania practice
of confessing judgment and executing on such judgments without
prior notice or hearing was actionable under § 1983.13 Jordan
Mitchell, Inc. then filed a separate suit against Fox, Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel, the firm representing the landlord." 4 The
district court dismissed both actions holding that the landlord and
per se unconstitutional. FRG, 919 F.2d at 856. D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187-88,
recognized the importance of confessions of judgment in a commercial context, while the
Swarb Court cast doubts on the Pennsylvania procedure. See 405 U.S. 191 (1971).
105. 20 F.3d 1250, 1270-73 (3d Cir. 1994).
106. Id.
107. 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
108. Jordan consolidated three cases arising out of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. These cases were Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien
& Frankel, 792 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1992), modified, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994); Jordan
v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 787 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992), modified, 20 F.3d
1250 (3d Cir. 1994); and Jordan v. Berman, 758 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1991), modified sub
nom. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994). Due to the
similarity of the case names the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
adopted modified case names to reduce the risk of confusion. The author of this Comment
also adopts this system as follows: Fox Rothschild II, 792 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
modified, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994); Fox Rothschild I, 787 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
modified, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1250); Berman I, 758 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1991), modified
sub nom. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
109. Jordan,20 F.3d at 1254-55.
110. Id. at 1253.
111. Id.
112. Jordan Mitchell did ultimately succeed in opening the judgment. Id.
113. Id.
114. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1253.
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were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of
its attorneys
1n5
law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
upon reviewing these consolidated cases, held that: (1) absent a
valid pre-judgment waiver, the act by the lessor and its attorney of
obtaining an execution on a confessed judgment, without notice or
hearing, deprived the lessee of due process once the actions
culminated in the sheriff's seizure of the lessee's property;" 6 (2)
an attorney's use of Pennsylvania garnishment procedure and the
client's instructions to the attorney to use such procedure made
them both liable as state actors, acting under the color of law for
§ 1983 purposes, once a debtor's due process rights are violated;" 7 and (3) the defense of qualified immunity is not available
to a private attorney faced with suit under § 1983, but the affirmative defense of good faith is permitted." 8
IV. Section 1983 Liability Under Jordan
In order for a defendant to be held liable under § 1983 a
plaintiff must establish that a federally protected constitutional or
statutory right has been violated by state action or by persons
acting under the color of law." 9 It is clear from the two elements
of a § 1983 claim that private persons may be found liable if, acting
under the color of law, they deprive another of a protected
right. 2 The right violated in the case of confessions of judgment
without valid waivers, that are executed upon by private parties, is
the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law.
As stated by the court in Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien &
Frankel,' the flaw in the Pennsylvania system is inadequate
hearing opportunities and insufficient pre-deprivation notice. 22
The existence of this flaw has provided a basis for § 1983 liability

115. While these appeals from the district court were pending, the United States Supreme
Court held that private persons acting under the color of law were not entitled to qualified

immunity. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
116. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1271.
117. Id. at 1267.
118. Id. at 1275-77.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
120. See generally Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)(imposing § 1983
liability upon private persons).
121. 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
122. See generally id. (criticizing Pennsylvania confession of judgment and execution
procedure).
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against not only creditors as private parties, but also the creditor's
attorneys as private parties. 123
A. The Liability of a Private Party Under § 1983
The central question, however, is when does a private party
invoking state procedure act under the color of law for § 1983
purposes? The Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 4
formulated two elements to be satisfied before a private party's
actions can be attributed to the state, thus making the private party
subject to liability under § 1983." 5 To meet the first element, the
deprivation must be caused by a private actor exercising a right or
privilege established by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the state, or by some person for whom the state is responsible.126 The second element requires that the party charged with
127
the conduct be one who can be categorized as a state actor.
Persons may become state actors when they are state officials, or
because they have acted in concert with, or with substantial aid
from, the state.128
Lugar involved a lessee-operator of a truck stop who remained
indebted to his supplier, Edmondson Oil Co. Edmondson sued on
the debt and sought a pre-judgment attachment to prevent the
debtor from disposing of the property.129 The clerk of the state
court issued the attachment writ upon which the sheriff executed.13 This execution encumbered Lugar's property, although it
remained in his possession. 31 Later, as per statute, the trial court
132
conducted a hearing on the propriety of the attachment.
Approximately thirty-four days after the initial attachment, a state
trial court judge dissolved the attachment because Edmondson had
failed to establish the grounds for attachment as alleged in his
petition.'33 The Court held that Edmondson Oil had acted under

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924.
Id.
Id. at 924-25,
Id. at 925.
ld.
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the color of law in participating in the deprivation of Lugar's
property, presenting a valid cause of action under § 1983.14
The court in Jordan affirmed the Berman P35 and the Fox
Rothschild

11136

decisions that entry of a confession of judgment

did not invoke the force of the state to collect or secure any part
of the creditors debt.1 37 The entry of judgment meets the first
part of the Lugar test, for entry is proscribed under Pennsylvania
procedural rules.1 38 But entry of the judgment alone, however,
is not enough to determine if the party is 139a state actor, thus
satisfying the second prong of the Lugar test.
A private person cannot be considered a state actor under
§ 1983 unless the state contributes substantially to the deprivation
of the plaintiff's rights."4 In the case of confessed judgments and
executions on those judgments, the state's use and authorization of
its own officers to apply the force of laws to aid a private person
in enforcing the judgment is enough to cause the private person to
be considered a state actor. 4 ' The Jordan court held that a
judgment creditor using Pennsylvania procedure for executing on
a confessed judgment acts
under the color of law and becomes a
142
state actor under Lugar.
B. A Private Attorney May Be Liable Under § 1983
As a state actor and acting under the color of law, a private
person may be subject to liability under § 1983 if his actions cause
the state to exert its compulsive powers to deprive another of
property.14 3 By executing on a judgment without providing the

134. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
135. 758 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1991), modified sub nom. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
136. 792 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1992), modified, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
137. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1265-66.
138. Id. at 1265.

139. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (stating that "action by a private party pursuant to []statute,
without something more, was not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a
'state actor'); Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1265.
140. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
141. Jordan,20 F.3d at 1267.
142. Id.

143. Id. A distinction must be drawn between merely confessing judgment, entering such
judgment, and executing upon the judgment, PA. R.C.P. 2951, 2956, 2958. While entering

into a confession of judgment clause raises issues of waiver, Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1971), executing on the judgment raises the issues of the notice and hearing required before
property may be seized, Jordan,20 F.3d at 1264-67.
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defendant with pre-seizure notice and hearing such a deprivation
occurs. This holding is not limited to judgment creditors; private
attorneys who aid a judgment creditor by invoking Pennsylvania
procedure to seize a judgment debtor's property will be considered
state actors for § 1983 purposes.' 44 Liability does not arise out of
the attorney's role as an officer of the court, 45 but rather because

the attorney invoked state procedure to deprive a judgment debtor
of his property."

The Supreme Court in Lugar held that private parties, in the
context of pre-judgment attachment, could be held liable under

§ 1983 if: (1) the deprivation was caused by the exercise of some
right created by the state and (2) the party charged with the
deprivation is a person who may fairly be characterized as a state
actor. 147 There is no language in Lugar contravening the line of
authority holding that private attorneys acting on behalf of their

clients are not liable under § 1983 absent an initial showing of
malice or other culpable conduct.'"
Furthermore, in applying Lugar, the district court in Fox
Rothschild I held that attorneys were considered state actors, not

144. Jordan,20 F.3d at 1267.
145. Fox Rothschild 1, 787 F. Supp. 471,475 (E.D. Pa. 1992), modified, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d
Cir. 1994); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) (holding that county public
defender does not act "under color of state law" when representing an indigent defendant);
-Drum v. Nasuti, 648 F. Supp. 888, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that private attorneys cannot
be held liable under § 1983 for actions taken on behalf of clients), affd., 831 F.2d 286 (3d
Cir. 1987).
146. CompareFox Rothschild 1,787 F. Supp. at 475 with Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844,
852 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that an attorney may be liable under § 1983 if on behalf of client
he pursues pre-judgment attachment procedure which the attorney knew, or should have
known, violated the debtor's constitutional rights).
147. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
148. In holding that private persons may be held liable under § 1983, Lugar did not
expressly alter the status of the private attorney. The court in Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d
at 852, disagreed with the defendant attorney's contention that he could not be liable under
§ 1983 because he only instituted the garnishment procedure at the request of his client.
Although the court held that the attorney may be liable, they did so because of his conduct
as an attorney in those circumstances. Id. Buechler stood to gain monetarily from the
garnishment and also refused to release the plaintiffs property upon request by his client.
Id. Here it appears that the court rejected Buechler's status as an officer of the court due
to his conduct. See also Voytko v. Ramada Inn of Atlantic City, 445 F. Supp. 315, 329-31
(D.N.J. 1978) (holding that an attorney who knows a client's actions are malicious, or whose
own actions contain malice, will not be immune from suit); United States General, Inc. v.
Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713, 717-18 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (holding that although attorneys are
generally immune even if their clients are not, malicious use of garnishment procedures will
dissolve the immunity normally afforded).
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due to their role as officers of the court,149 but rather because
they acted to invoke the state attachment proceedings." ° While
attorneys would meet this criteria because they acted with substantial assistance from the state to deprive another of property without
due process, there is no basis in Lugar to alter an attorney's
liability when acting as an officer of the court unless the attorney
maliciously invoked an invalid statute or otherwise abused process.
In the latter instance the attorney no longer should be afforded the
protections due an officer of the court and should, correctly, face
liability as a private party utilizing state procedure as defined under
Lugar.15 '
Attorneys, but for their role as officers of the court, would not
be filing papers for attachment on behalf of clients. In litigation
and in the representation of clients, attorneys act as officers of the
court. How this conduct on behalf of clients can be separated from
the attorney's official role goes unsubstantiated in Fox Rothschild
I. Therefore, attorneys representing clients, by the very nature of
their position, do not act in a truly private capacity. 152 However,
when an attorney acts against his client's wishes, or pursues a
defendant or a debtor with malicious regard, or acts for his own
interests in filing attachment proceedings, the attorney can fairly be
considered to have met the second prong of Lugar. This is because
the attorney is no longer within the duties that bind him as an
officer of the court. In those circumstances the attorney has
stepped out of that sacred role and is truly acting in a private
153
capacity "wholly distinct from any duty owed to the court.'
An attorney partaking in such conduct rightly faces liability under
the Lugar analysis.

149. Fox Rothschild I, 787 F. Supp. at 475. The court agreed with the defendant that a
private attorney in the course of representing a client could not be considered a state actor
by virtue of the attorney's capacity as an officer of the court, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2521 (1981) ("Persons admitted to the bar of the courts of this Commonwealth and to
practice law pursuant to general rules shall thereby hold the office of attorney at law."), but
still found the defendant attorneys to be state actors because they invoked state attachment
proceedings. Fox Rothschild I, 787 F. Supp. at 475.
150. Fox Rothschild 1, 787 F. Supp. at 475.
151. 457 U.S. at 937.
152. "[W]e do not hold today that a 'private party's mere invocation of state legal
procedures constitutes joint participation or conspiracy with state officials satisfying the
§ 1983 requirement of action under color of law."' Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 n.21.
153. Fox Rothschild I, 787 F. Supp. at 476 (holding that mere invocation of state
attachment procedure made attorney liable under § 1983 even without the existence of
malice).
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The difference between an attorney acting in this private
capacity and that of an officer of the court for § 1983 purposes is
also demonstrated in that § 1983 liability will arise when a
conspiracy or a joint participation occurs between an attorney and
a state official."' Under this conspiracy arrangement, the attorney again is acting beyond the role as an officer of the court and
thus properly faces liability. Under current law, an attorney facing
suit under § 1983 may defend with only a good faith defense. 5 '
C. Defenses Available Against § 1983 Claims
In Wyatt v. Cole156 the United States Supreme Court held

that qualified immunity is not available to private defendants faced
with § 1983 suits. 57 Qualified immunity provides that unless a
plaintiff's allegations state a claim of conduct violating clearly
established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled
to dismissal prior to any discovery.158 The concept of qualified
immunity recognizes a privilege not to stand trial or face the other
burdens brought by litigation, if the conduct complained of by the
plaintiff does not violate clearly established law.'59 This marks
the difference between immunity from suit and a mere defense to
liability,"6° such as a good faith affirmative defense.
The Wyatt Court enunciated a string of public policy rationales
outlining the purpose of recognizing qualified immunity. The
immunity has been used to protect government officials "where it
was necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good;" to
deter intimidation and to contribute to "fearless decision making;"
and to prevent inhibition in discretionary actions. 6 ' According
to Wyatt, private parties hold no position that require them to
exercise discretion, nor are private parties concerned with enhancing the public good. 62 Furthermore, any immunity extended to

154. Shipley v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 703 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd,
877 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1989).
155. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277.
156. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
157. Id. at 168-69.
158. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
159. Id.
160. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 166.
161. Id. at 167.
162. Id. at 168.
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private parties would not affect the decisiveness or forceful nature
of public officials when performing their duties."6
Although qualified immunity is not available to private
defendants, the affirmative defense of good faith is an option for
such persons held accountable under § 1983.1" In Wyatt the
Supreme Court did "not foreclose the possibility that private
defendants faced with § 1983 suits under Lugar . . could be

entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith."' 65 The
Court also rationalized that perhaps a plaintiff in a § 1983 action
should be required to sustain a heavier burden when bringing suit
against a private party." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has decided on remand in Wyatt 167 that good faith would
be a defense available to private persons sued on the basis of
Lugar."a The Fifth Circuit required the plaintiffs to demonstrate
malice, as well as introduce evidence that the defendants either
knew or should have known of the statutes constitutional feebleness.169 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also
accepted0 a modified version of the good faith defense found in
7
Wyatt.1
The Jordan court held that a good faith defense asserted by
private defendants should not be defeated unless the plaintiff could
show malice on the part of the defendant.171 Malice here means
a subjective mind state; that is, did the defendants know they were
depriving the debtor of a constitutional right.'72 Utilization of
qualified immunity would meet the same end as a good faith
7
defense.1
1 Use of qualified immunity would also meet the policy
163. Id.
164. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir.
1994)(stating good faith affirmative defense is available to private actors).
165. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169.
166. Id.
167. 994 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1993).
168. Id. at 1118-20 (discussing the good faith defense).
169. Id. at 1115.

170. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1276 (requiring a subjective appreciation by a creditor and the
attorney that their conduct deprived a debtor of his constitutional right to due process).
171. Id. at 1276-77.
172. Id. at 1277.
173. Qualified immunity and a good faith defense would both serve to protect from
liability
those alleged to have violated § 1983. The difference is that qualified immunity
forces the plaintiff, after the immunity is pleaded, to carry the burden or else face a
defendant immune from suit, Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir.

1994), whereas the good faith defense is just that, a defense, requiring the plaintiff to
establish malice and the requisite mind frame to overcome it, Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113,
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considerations 74 made important by the attorney's peculiar role
as both an officer of the court and the zealous advocate of his
client, that are not addressed by the good faith defense.
D. Analysis of the Rationale for Denying Qualified Immunity to
PrivateAttorneys Who are Subject to § 1983 Suits
Denying qualified immunity to a private attorney who finds
himself subject to § 1983 liability is inconsistent with the status of
an officer of the court and harms the judicial process. Qualified
immunity should be extended to attorneys acting on behalf of their
clients, with the veil of immunity being pierced, once asserted, only
upon an initial showing of a violation of a clearly established right
or some other culpable conduct.175 This is similar to the good
faith affirmative defense except that under good faith an attorney
may be sued without any allegation or proof of malice. The
attorney, of course, may then defend upon the suit, forcing the
plaintiff to provide evidence of malice or else be forced out of
court.'76 Under qualified immunity a plaintiff could not sue
without proof of malicious conduct. A defendant attorney would
only have to face suit where the plaintiff had already met this
higher standard.
Attorneys are officers of the court in Pennsylvania. 77 When
acting on behalf of a client, an attorney does not operate as a
private person acting for her own sake, but rather she is the client's
representative in the legal system; an attorney in this capacity is an
officer of the court, not a private individual. Absent some selfinterested motive or malice, attorneys cannot fairly be categorized

1120 (5th Cir. 1993).
174. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167 (stating that qualified immunity promotes fearless decisionmaking, prevents the inhibition of discretionary action, and promotes the vigorous exercise
of official authority). See United States General,Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713, 717-18
(E.D. Wis. 1975)(citing the obvious chilling effect, caused by the threat of civil liability, upon
an attorney's enthusiasm to vigorously defend his client).
175. Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994). Upon a motion for summary
judgment claiming qualified immunity, a plaintiff must overcome two obstacles. First, the
allegation must state a claim of the violation of clearly established law. Second, the plaintiff
must present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact
committed the acts that violated the law. Id. at 386.
176. Wyatt, 994 F.2d at 1120 (stating that private defendants should not be held liable
under § 1983 absent a showing of malice and that they either knew of should have known
of the statute's constitutional infirmity).
177. See supra note 149.
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as state actors under § 1983 solely by their virtue as private
persons.
The same policy reasons highlighted in Wyatt 78 apply to
attorneys. Fear of civil liability upon the filing of every form,
motion, or petition, or upon the initiation of suit or attachment
proceedings would contribute to the hesitant administration of
justice. This would raise fear and intimidation above principled
decision making grounded in presumably valid law t 79 and procedure. This fear of civil liability would place an inhibition on the
zealous advocate's discretion and on the advocate's ability to
pursue all procedural and statutory avenues for the client.
Similar policy considerations were raised by the court in United
States General, Inc. v. Schroeder.t"° There the district court noted
that only the public's rights would suffer if civil liability is allowed
to hang over an attorney's head.18' The court explained that as
a matter of public policy an attorney's own personal fortunes and
fate should not be caught in the balance with the invocation of
every procedure or motion under the law."8
Procedurally, an attorney operating under the good faith
system would be inhibited from zealous advocacy or from pursuing
all procedural avenues for the client because a party could bring a
§ 1983 suit merely based upon this conduct, without a demonstration of malice. The attorney would then have to defend by raising
the issue of good faith, which the plaintiff would have to disprove.
If malice were present, the suit would go forward. If malice were
not present, the attorney had been forced to defend a groundless
charge, wasting time, money, and resources, as well as damaging
the attorney's legal reputation. Moreover, the next time the
attorney makes a decision for a client or acts on a client's behalf,
178. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167-68. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
179. Under this author's analysis if an attorney utilized a procedure or statute knowing
it was legally invalid, the attorney would be acting outside of the realm of an officer of the
court and would be presumed to have acted with some culpable mind frame and, therefore,
the attorney would find that qualified immunity would not be available. See, e.g., supra notes
156-158 and accompanying text.
180. 400 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
181. Id. at 717.

182. Id. This same line of reasoning has been applied since Lugar and Wyatt. See
Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that Lugar test does not alter

vast authority that private attorneys do not act under color of law due to their role as officers
of the court); Williams v. Dark, 844 F. Supp. 210, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing numerous cases
in establishing that private attorneys acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors),
affid., 19 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 1994).
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the once zealous advocate might not pursue every procedural
avenue or opportunity because of the threat of civil suit.
Under a qualified immunity scheme, a plaintiff could only
sustain a suit, once immunity had been pleaded, by alleging a
violation of clearly established law and by bringing proof of such
conduct forward. This would have four important effects: (1) a
reduction in the number of claims an attorney would have to
defend against because a plaintiff could not proceed at all without
a clear allegation of malice;"8 (2) a deterring effect upon plaintiffs from bringing suits against attorneys based upon § 1983 where
no malicious conduct occurred; (3) punishment of those attorneys
who venture close to or across the line between negligent conduct
and culpable conduct;"8 and (4) relief of any inhibition an attorney might have in utilizing the full procedural process afforded to
attorneys by the state in order to benefit the client in the pursuit
of justice.
In short, use of qualified immunity would define a zone of play
that is off limits to attorneys. If this zone is crossed, the attorney
may be subject to § 1983 suits. Once attorneys venture into the
malicious zone, they open themselves up for liability. Under the
good faith system, an attorney opens herself up to liability by
merely playing the game; she then must challenge the accuser to
show that her conduct did not fall within that forbidden zone.
Pennsylvania's answer for preventing § 1983 liability and for
providing sufficient notice to debtors are the proposed rules of civil
procedure governing confessions of judgment.
V. Proposed Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure Governing Confessions of Judgment and Writs of
Execution
Pennsylvania has decided to amend its procedural rules to
eliminate § 1983 liability before it attaches. 85 The proposed rules
have two general aims. The first goal is to protect consumers from

183. In the absence of qualified immunity a plaintiff could proceed against an attorney
without proof of malice, but would have to show that the defendant attorney acted with the
requisite culpable conduct in order to succeed on the claim should the attorney raise the
affirmative defense of good faith. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1276-77.
184. More than negligence is required to sustain a § 1983 claim. Daniels v. William, 474
U.S. 327, 333-34 (1985); Jordan,20 F.3d at 1277.
185. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2382-86 (June 17, 1995).
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signing away their rights in confession notes on residential leases
and consumer credit transactions." 6 Second, the proposed rules
aim to remedy the shortcomings of the notice requirements of the
Pennsylvania procedure for executing on judgments as addressed
by Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel."8
A. Consumer Credit Transactions
Proposed Rule 2950 narrows the scope of the proceedings by
not allowing confessed judgments to be entered when they were
"executed by a natural person in connection with a consumer credit
transaction."" The amendment aims to abolish confession of
judgment in consumer credit transactions because these transactions
usually involve an unsophisticated debtor who is without the
benefit of counsel and the contracts entered into are usually ones
of adhesion.189

Unsophisticated buyers entering the uneven

playing field of an adhesion contract may not have validly waived
their due process rights upon signing a confession of judgment
clause. This concern19°is founded in the Supreme Court's holdings
in Swarb v. Lennox.
Swarb involved a group of plaintiffs acting on behalf of all
Pennsylvanians who signed documents with provisions allowing an
entry of a confession of judgment.'91 The plaintiffs maintained
that the Pennsylvania procedure was prima facie unconstitutional
because it was in violation of due process.'92 The Supreme Court
disagreed with that contention, but affirmed the district court's 93

holding that judgment by confession may not be entered into

186. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2382 (June 17, 1995).
187. Samuel B. Fineman, Proposed Rules Curtail Confession of Judgment, 18 PA. L.
WKLY.

762, 791 (1995).

188. See supra note 11.
189. Generally, an adhesion contract is a standardized contract form offered to consumers
of goods and services on essentially a "take it or leave it" basis without affording the

consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain. Contracts of this sort are usually offered under
such conditions that the consumer cannot acquire the desired product or service unless they
acquiesce to the form of the contract. An adhesion contract usually offers no choice to the
weaker party as to its terms. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
190. 405 U.S. 191 (1971).
191. Id. at 196.

192. Id.
193. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 191 (1971).
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against any member of the recognized class of persons,194 absent
proof that at the time the debtor entered into the document he had
constitutionally waived his rights by submitting to the Pennsylvania
system. The Court declared the entry of a confession of judgment
unconstitutional when applied to those with incomes under $10,000,
unless the required valid waiver could be shown to have occurred.1 95
The $10,000 limit came largely in response to the fact that
uneducated consumers, without the benefit of counsel, were
entering into cognovit clauses 196 without understanding the full
effect, or any of the effects, of the document.1"
The Court
reasoned that an intelligent and voluntary waiver of due process
rights is impossible without this understanding 8
The Proposed Rule 2950 completely abolishes confessions of
judgment in consumer credit transactions!"
This proposal
acknowledges that adhesion contracts are entered on all economic
levels by consumers and that the waiver of due process rights
cannot realistically be tied to a fixed monetary value.
B. Notice and Hearing Requirements
The other proposed change is the rescission of Rule 295821
and the adoption of three other notice rules to be used in its
place.2 °1 Under the current rules, notice of the entry of judgment

194. Swarb, 405 U.S. at 199 (recognizing a class of persons with incomes of less than
$10,000 who cannot constitutionally enter into confession of judgment clauses).
i95. Id. at 200.
196. A cognovit judgment clause is a confession of judgment by the debtor. The debtor
provides her written authority and her direction for entry of judgment against her in the
event of a default in payment. Such provision in a debt instrument or agreement permits the
creditor or her attorney on default to appear in court and confers judgment against the
debtor. Such agreements are prohibited, or greatly restricted, in many states; though where
these clauses are permitted, their constitutionality has been upheld. BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 259-60 (6th ed. 1990).
197. Swarb, 405 U.S. at 198.
198. Id. at 199 (affirming the lower court's finding).
199. PA. R.C.P. 2950 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull.
2375 (June 17, 1995).
200. PA. R.C.P. 2958.
201. PA. R.C.P. 2958.1-.3 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2377-78 (June 17, 1995). All of these proposed rules are governed by proposed rule
2958.4 which provides that if notice is given under proposed rule 2958.1 the plaintiff may not
proceed under 2958.2 or 2958.3. PA. R.C.P. 2958.4(a) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,
1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995). It also provides that if a plaintiff
proceeds under any one of these three rules, the plaintiff need not act to provide notice
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is to be provided by the prothonotary through ordinary mail
immediately after judgment has been entered. 2" A judgment by
confession demands that a copy of all documents filed with the
prothonotary by the plaintiff in support of the confessed judgment
be mailed to the defendant.2 3 Upon entry of the judgment,
execution may be commenced by filing a praecipe with the
prothonotary of the county where the judgment was entered.2"
Furthermore, although declared not applicable to judgments
entered by confession on or after December 1, 1973,205 the Jordan

court notes the elaborate notice provisions of Rule 2958.2" Rule
2958 provides that notice of the judgment is to be mailed within
twenty days after its entry.2'° In that twenty day period the
plaintiff may issue a writ of execution even where the notice in

Rule 2958(a) has not yet been mailed.2° Any lien made pursuant
to the writ is valid even after the twenty days has expired, but no
other proceeding may take place under the writ until twenty days
after the notice has been mailed and the affidavit of mailing has
been filed. 2 9 Furthermore, if the affidavit of mailing has not
been filed within twenty days after the entry of judgment, no writ
of execution may be issued until twenty days after the affidavit has
been filed. 1 °
The Pennsylvania notice process faced severe criticism in
Jordan as not providing adequate pre-deprivation procedural
protections to adjudicate a debtor's protest to the entry of
judgment and the issuance of a writ of execution against him.2 n

again on a subsequent execution on the same judgment where the required notice was
provided and the defendant either acted and was denied or where the defendant failed to
act within thirty days as provided by proposed rule 2954(a)(3). PA. R.C.P. 2958.4(b)
(Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
Again, due process has been met since the defendant has both been given notice and had at
a minimum an opportunity for a hearing. PA. R.C.P. 2958.1-.3 (Proposed Recommendation
No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2377-78 (June 17, 1995).
202. PA. R.C.P. 236(a).
203. PA. R.C.P. 236(a)(1).
204. PA. R.C.P. 3103(a).
205. PA. R.C.P. 2958(f).
206. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1262 (3d Cir. 1994).
207. PA. R.C.P. 2958(a).
208. PA. R.C.P. 2958(b).
209. Id.
210. PA. R.C.P. 2958(c).
211. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1270.
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The district court in Berman 1212 delineated three procedural
protections that are due before attachment or garnishment can be
constitutionally permissible.2 13 First, to obtain a writ of execution
a creditor must produce a sworn document setting forth the basis
of the claim against the debtor.214 Second, the issuance of the
writ should be conditioned on review and approval by a competent
official vested with the proper discretion.215 Finally, an opportunity must be available for a prompt post-seizure hearing where the
creditor must demonstrate at a minimum the probable validity of
the claim.216 The Third Circuit agreed and held that where a
debtor's due process rights have not been validly waived, and the
debtor's property has been executed upon, absent some prompt
post-seizure or pre-deprivation hearing, the due process rights of
the debtor will have been violated.217
1. ProposedRules 2958.1 and2958.2. -The Proposed Rules
2958.1 and 2958.2 provide pre-deprivation notice and a hearing on
the merits, but do not provide an examination of whether or not a
valid waiver of due process rights has occurred.2 18 Proposed Rule
2958.3 provides for an immediate post-seizure hearing on the issue
of the debtor's valid waiver of due process rights. 2 9 A plaintiff/creditor may choose to proceed under only one of these
rules. 2 ° A plaintiff may not proceed under 2958.2 or 2958.3 if
notice was already provided under 2958.1.221
Proposed Rule 2958.1 prescribes that notice shall be served on
the defendant at least thirty days before a praecipe for a writ of
execution may be filed.' 2 The form in which notice is to be filed

212. 758 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1991), modified sub nom. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
213. Id. at 279.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 279-80.
217. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1271.
218. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2382-86 (June 17, 1995).
219. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(b) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
220. PA. R.C.P. 2958.4 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
221. Id.
222. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2384 (June 17, 1995).
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advises defendants that they may have avenues to pursue in regards
to receiving relief from the confessed judgment or in preventing
execution on that judgment.2" Where a defendant does not take
action to file a petition seeking relief from judgment within thirty
days after the date of the service of notice, the defendant will be
precluded from any further relief under the proposed amendment
to Rule 2959.224 But if a defendant does take action, the court
will hear and decide the grounds set forth in the petition for
relief.21 The defendant has the choice of whether or not to have
a day in court; under either scenario, though, the defendant has an
opportunity to be heard, it is up to her to exercise that opportunity.
Where an opportunity to be heard exists and its exercise is solely
226
within the discretion of the defendant, § 1983 liability vanishes.
Proposed Rule 2958.2 governs the notice requirements for
execution on real property.227 Here, the notice must be served
upon the defendant within thirty days prior to the sheriff's sale of
the real property or real property and personal property being sold
together pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code. 2' Notice
of the execution on the property and of the sheriff's sale shall be
served together under the requirements of Rule 3129.2.229

The

notice provided by this rule advises the defendant to take action in
order to obtain relief from the judgment or to delay the execution
prior to the sheriff's sale.230 The defendant is further advised by
the notice to file a petition for relief from judgment within thirty
days after the notice is served. 231 Again, like under Proposed
Rule 2958.1, a defendant who does not take action will consequently be barred from any further relief under the proposed amend-

223. PA. R.C.P. 2964 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull.
2380 (June 17, 1995).
224. PA. R.C.P. 2959(a)(3) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2379 (June 17, 1995).
225. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), 25 Pa.
Bull. 2384 (June 17, 1995).
226. Id.
227. PA. R.C.P. 2958.2 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995) (providing for notice when the property to be levied upon consists
solely of real property or of real and personal property to be sold with the real property).
228. PA. R.C.P. 2958.2(a)(2) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995). See also 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9501(d) (1982).
229. PA. R.C.P. 3129.2(c).
230. PA. R.C.P. 2965 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull.
2380-81 (June 17, 1995) (providing the form of notice).
231. Id.

19961

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT

1019

ment to Rule 2959. 212 Likewise, § 1983 liability disappears once
the defendant has an opportunity to be heard prior to any
deprivation of property.
2. Proposed Rule 2958.3. -Proposed Rule 2958.3 provides
for notice in the form of Proposed Rule 2965 and also a form for
a petition to strike judgment and a request for prompt hearing."
This notice request shall be served upon the defendant with the
writ of execution if the property to be levied upon consists of
personal property or personal and real property not within the
realm of Proposed Rule 2958.2.' Here no notice or opportunity
to be heard exists prior to any levy or attachment upon the
defendant's property. 5 The notice that is provided at the time
the writ of execution is served advises the defendant of a possible
right to the return of the property if there was not a valid waiver
of due process rights or if there exist some other defense or valid
objection .1 6 The defendant is advised of the right to a prompt
post-deprivation hearing confined to the issue of waiver of due
process. 237 The defendant has thirty days to respond to the
notice, after which time Proposed Rule 2959(a)(3) bars the
defendant from further relief, absent some compelling reason."3
Under subdivision (b) of Proposed Rule 2958.3, the defendant
may file with the sheriff a petition to strike judgment. 9 This
petition is limited to the issue of whether the defendant made a
valid waiver of his rights to notice and hearing prior to the entry of

232. PA. R.C.P. 2959(a)(3) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2379 (June 17, 1995). A denial on the grounds of lateness of filing may be
overcome by a demonstration that compelling circumstances caused the delay. Id.
233. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
234. PA. R.C.P. 2958.2(a)(1), (2) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
235. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
236. PA. R.C.P. 2966 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull.
2381 (June 17, 1995) (providing the form of notice).
237. Id.
238. PA. R.C.P. 2959(a)(3) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2379 (June 17, 1995).
239. PA. R.C.P. 2967 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull.
2381-82 (June 17, 1995). PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(b) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995),
reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
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judgment. 21 Upon filing of the petition, the sheriff is to immediately notify the plaintiff and present the matter to the court.241
The court must hear the matter within three business days of its
presentation to the court and promptly dispose of it.24 2 Execution

proceedings are stayed from the time the defendant files the forms
for a hearing with the sheriff243 to the time the court makes a
determination on that hearing.
If the court determines that the plaintiff has demonstrated, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that a valid waiver of the
defendant's right to notice and hearing prior to the entry of
judgment has occurred, the court must enter an order reflecting
such, and the stay of execution automatically terminates. 2 " But
if the plaintiff fails to establish the required showing, the court shall
enter an order vacating the writ of execution and
any seized or
245
returned.
be
must
writ
the
under
property
levied
Proposed Rule 2958.3 provides the prompt post-judgment,
post-seizure and hearing opportunity that is required by Jordan.
Furthermore, this rule attempts to carve out a standard governing
what proof is necessary to establish a valid waiver by setting 2 a6
"preponderance of the evidence" standard in subdivision (c)(1).

1

The opportunity to be heard again rises up to theoretically cripple
any § 1983 challenge.
C. The Proposed Rules' Likelihood of Success
1. Consumer Credit Transactions. -The
abolition of
confession of judgment clauses in consumer credit transactions will
likely be the most successful of all of the proposed rules. The chief
reason for this predicted success is that the action is abolished; no

240. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(b) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
241. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(b), (c) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in
25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
242. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
243. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(d) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
244. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c)(1) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
245. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c)(2) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
246. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2385 (June 17, 1995).
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longer may any person enter or obtain a confessed judgment
against another person for family, personal or household purposes.247 The difficulty will be in defining and applying the terms
"family, personal or household" purposes.2 8 Clearly a natural
person who buys a product for purposes other than family,
household or personal uses would find themselves subject to a
confessed judgment if they had signed such a clause.
A scenario can easily be imagined where, for instance, a
personal computer is purchased for family educational and
entertainment use and also for use as the sole database for a small
home operated business. The computer seller routinely includes a
confession of judgment clause in its purchase agreements, which is
signed by the computer purchaser. The purchaser then fails to
repay, and the seller moves to have the confessed judgment entered
in its favor. Is this a consumer credit transaction under Proposed
Rule 2950? At a minimum, if judgment is entered and the debtor
petitions to strike or open the judgment, this scenario should
provide
a meritorious defense and an issue for consideration by a
9
24

jury.

2. Notice and Hearing Requirements. -The goal of the
proposed rules pertaining to notice is to provide the judgment
debtor/defendant with notice in all cases prior to, or during,
execution on a judgment by confession. 2 ° If this procedural goal
is met, then the rules have a high likelihood of satisfying the
criticism meted out in Jordanconcerning Pennsylvania's confession
of judgment procedure."5 When the defendant's rights were not
validly waived, notice prior to property deprivation and an
opportunity to be heard must be provided before the debtor's
2s2
property can be seized in order to comport with due process.
Except for the removal of § 1983 liability, plaintiff/creditors under
the proposed rules will not be greatly affected by the adoption of

247. PA. R.C.P. 2950 official note (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2375 (June 17, 1995).
248. See infra note 11.
249. In order to open a confessed judgment, the moving party must act promptly, allege
a meritorious defense and present evidence sufficient to create an issue for the jury. Liazis
v. Kosta, Inc., 618 A.2d 450, 452 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), alloc. denied, 637 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1993).
250. PA. R.C.P. Explanatory Cmt. (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted
in 25 Pa. Bull. 2383 (June 17, 1995).
251. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1270-71 (3d Cir. 1994)
252. Id. at 1271.
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the rules. The proposed rules maintain the confession of judgment
process, but in doing so the rules strengthen the notice and hearing
due to debtors before their property may be executed upon.
The current Pennsylvania rules governing notice of the entry
of a confession of judgment and the issuance of a writ of execution
to enforce that judgment are spelled out in Rule 236253 and, to a
limited extent, in Rule 2958.'
Rule 236 provides that the
prothonotary, after entering the judgment, must send the defendant
notice of the entry along with the supporting documents."
Failure to provide notice or to mail the required documents does
not affect the lien of the judgment. 6 Rule 2958 allows for a writ
of execution to be issued prior to the defendant receiving notice of
the judgment entered against him. 7 No other time requirements
exist as to the relationship between the issuance of the writ and the
notice of entry of judgment. This gap allows deprivation of
property without notice of the judgment against the debtor and
without the opportunity for a hearing on the merits prior to the
service of the writ. Without a valid waiver of the debtor's due
process rights, this is where § 1983 liability potentially arises. The
proposed rules cause the issue of § 1983 liability to vanish by
providing notice and an opportunity for hearing prior to any
property deprivation. Proposed Rules 2958.1 and 2958.2 provide
a debtor with a thirty-day period, prior to the issuance of a writ of
execution, with which to file a petition seeking relief, after which
she may lose both her right to be heard and her property. 8 In
other words, the defendant is granted an opportunity to be heard,

253. PA. R.C.P. 236.
254. PA. R.C.P. 2958. This rule does not apply to judgments entered on or after
December 1, 1973. PA. R.C.P. 2958(0.
255. PA. R.C.P. 236(a)(1).
256. PA. R.C.P. 236(c).

257. See generally PA. R.C.P. 2958(b) (providing that within twenty days after the entry
of judgment, the plaintiff may issue a writ of execution even if notice has not yet been
mailed).
258. See PA. R.C.P. 2958.1(a) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in
25. Pa. Bull. 2377 (June 17, 1995). Under this proposed rule notice is to be substantially in
the form of proposed rule 2964. PA. R.C.P. 2964 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,
1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2380 (June 17, 1995). See PA. R.C.P. 2958.2(b) (Proposed
Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995). Under

proposed rule 2958.2 notice is to be substantially in the form of proposed rule 2965. PA.
R.C.P. 2965 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin Pa. Bull. 2380-81 (June
17, 1995).
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all the debtor must do is exercise that opportunity through the
procedural framework of opening and striking judgment.
Under these proposed rules a defendant is offered time to
prepare a defense to the judgment and to act on the notice served.
Under both Proposed Rule 2958.1 and 2958.2 a defendant has at
least thirty days before sale of the property2 9 or before an
execution writ can be issued."6 This provides adequate preparation time and sufficient notice upon which the defendant can act.
There is little, if any, chance that a defendant's property will be
executed upon prior to the defendant receiving notice. Once the
defendant has been given the required notice, the defendant must
act promptly. Delay will not be tolerated by the court.26'
In sharp contrast, Proposed Rule 2958.3 allows notice to be
notice, in the form of
served with the writ of execution. 262 The ntc
Proposed Rule 2966, informs the defendant that he may have a
right to the return of the property and a right to a prompt hearing
on the issue of waiver of due process. 263 This petition for hearing
must be heard by the court within three days of receiving the
petition from the sheriff.264 Under Proposed Rule 2958.3(c)(a)
the court must determine if the plaintiff has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived the notice and hearing rights
prior to the entry of judgment. 265 If such a showing cannot be
made, the court must vacate the writ of execution and strike the
judgment.2 6

259. PA. R.C.P. 2958.2(a) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
260. PA. R.C.P. 2958.1(a) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
261. See PA. R.C.P. 2959(a)(3) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin
25 Pa. Bull. 2379 (June 17, 1995)(requiring the defendant to demonstrate compelling reasons
for a delay in filing a petition or face denial of the petition).
262. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
263. PA. R.C.P. 2966 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull.
2381 (June 17, 1995).
264. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
265. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c)(1) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
266. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c)(2) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
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This procedure will be utilized by plaintiffs who are confident
in the validity of the defendant's waiver of rights or who are unsure
if the debtor/defendant will dispose of the property once notice of
the judgment and pending execution is received by the debtor. If
a debtor did not validly waive his rights, and the plaintiff utilized
this rule, a defendant should rely upon 2958.3(c)(1) to push the
burden onto the plaintiff to prove that a valid waiver had occurred.
Again, § 1983 liability is theoretically averted because,
although notice is served with the writ, the defendant may
immediately utilize Proposed Rule 2958.3(c)(1). Between invoking
this procedure and the resolution of the waiver issue, the execution
is stayed.267 This prevents any permanent deprivation of property
until the waiver issue is resolved, thereby presumably avoiding the
§ 1983 question.
Proposed Rule 2958.3 is perhaps constitutionally most
questionable. Since the notice of entry of judgment is served with
the writ of execution, a defendant has no opportunity to prepare a
defense, nor any notice at all prior to seizure or attachment of his
property and accounts. The defendant under this rule has thirty
days to file a petition to strike judgment if the debtor's rights were
not validly waived. 26 In that thirty day period it is reasonable to
say that the debtor's property could be disposed of prior to the
debtor filing the proper petition. Although once the petition is
filed the execution is stayed until disposition of the issue,269 the
form of notice does caution the debtor that "it will be too late" for
the debtor to regain the seized property once it has been sold by
the sheriff or turned over to the creditor/plaintiff. 2 ° If a debtor
does not act promptly within the first few days of the attachment,
the plaintiff could be in possession of the property. Furthermore,
accounts held by a garnishee once attached cannot be used by a
debtor. Under Proposed Rule 2958.3, if a debtor files on the last
possible day, up to thirty days from the date of the initial attachment could pass before a debtor would have access to the seized

267. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(d) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
268. PA. R.C.P. 2966 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126,1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull.
2381 (June 17, 1995).
269. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(d) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
270. PA. R.C.P. 2966 (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa. Bull.
2381 (June 17, 1995).
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accounts.2 71 Such a lengthy delay is likely since a debtor may
need most of the thirty days to gather evidence and proof for the
hearing on the validity of the waiver of rights, especially since the
petition is to be heard within three business days after it is
filed.272 If the defendant provides inadequate evidence and
permits the plaintiff to establish by the preponderance of the
evidence 273 that a valid waiver of rights occurred, the debtor will
lose the seized property. Here it is in the debtor's best interests to
thoroughly prepare for the petition hearing.
Under a strict construction of the proposed rules, this outcome
may place the debtor in an unreasonable situation. If a debtor
immediately files the petition in order to receive a prompt stay of
execution, the debtor may be defeated at the immediately upcoming hearing on the petition. On the other hand, a debtor may use
most of the thirty days in which he has to file to prepare a
thorough and adequate defense, gathering evidence on the nature
of the alleged waiver. If this course is followed, the debtor will
face a longer period of property deprivation until the petition is
filed and the stay granted. Proposed Rule 2958.3 may be wrought
with danger for the unwary judgment debtor.
VI. Conclusion
If a creditor executes upon a confessed judgment clause that
was not voluntarily entered into by the debtor, and causes the
debtor's property to be deprived, the creditor may be liable under
§ 1983. A private attorney, as an officer of the court, acting on
behalf of such a creditor, who utilizes a seemingly valid law or
procedure, should not face the same liability as the client, or as an
attorney who knowingly utilizes an invalid procedure. Attorneys
should only face liability in these situations where they act with
malicious or other culpable conduct. As an officer of the court274
and as an advocate of the client, an attorney must pursue all legal
and procedural advantages. An advocate should not have to fear
civil suit at every procedural cross road.

271. See id. (allowing thirty days from the date of service of notice and the writ for a
debtor to file a petition seeking relief).
272. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprintedin 25 Pa.
Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
273. PA. R.C.P. 2958.3(c)(1) (Proposed Recommendation No. 126, 1995), reprinted in 25
Pa. Bull. 2378 (June 17, 1995).
274. See infra note 148.
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Pennsylvania's proposed civil procedure rules will limit § 1983
liability against both the client and the attorney. The rules
strengthen the notice requirements afforded to debtors and
defendants and provide opportunities for hearing prior to property
deprivation under all instances where judgment by confession is
entered. The defendant need only exercise these opportunities.
Under the proposed Pennsylvania rules, § 1983 liability properly
vanishes where notice and hearing are given prior to any permanent deprivation of property.
Eric B. Smith

